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Each year millions of tons of Dangerous Goods are transported between France and Italy using especially road and 
rail transportation systems. These DGT cross the territories that gather dense urbanized places, critical infrastructures 
(highways, tunnels, bridges etc.) and organizations (hospitals, police and firemen centres, rail stations etc.), and 
protected areas (national, regional and departmental natural reserves and parks). According to the definitions of 
vulnerability and resilience, the authors propose a spatial model based on two indices in order to characterize the 
level of vulnerability and resilience of the territory induced by the DGT. Those two indices are implemented into a 
Geographical Information System (GIS) in order to define a Spatial Decision Support System (SDSS) dedicated to 
the decision-makers (infrastructures managers, public authorities and transport companies). As a conclusion, the 
authors discuss the levels of vulnerability and resilience of the territory according to the different kind of 
transportation systems, i.e. rail and road in order to underline recommendations for DGT planning. 
1. DGT and risk for the territory 
Dangerous Goods Transportation (DGT) is a crucial activity that participates to the development of industry and the 
use of transport means. The main transportation means for dangerous goods are the transportation by road and by rail 
(Eurostat web site). The role of DGT in our economy is significant but, in another hand, this activity carries risks for 
the territories crossed by such transports has it is mentioned by different technological accidents databases like ARIA 
in France.   
If major accidents of DGT remain rare, their consequences are usually severe: many victims, damages on the 
environment and infrastructures, and economic loss. 
Risks associated with DGT raise many questions about their probability of occurrence, their potential consequences 
and the vulnerability and resilience of territories crossed by DGT. The need to assess the territorial vulnerability and 
resilience seems essential in order to manage the territory and the afferent risks generated by DGT. 
The main goal of the SECTRAM project is the development of common logistics solutions to improve the security 
services and transport infrastructures at interregional levels. It is a collaborative effort between ARMINES, 
University of Genoa, Operating Group of Fréjus Tunnel and the Liguria Region. In this frame and starting form the 
definitions of vulnerability and resilience, the authors developed a spatial model based on two indices in order to 
characterize the level of vulnerability and of resilience of the territory induced by the DGT in the considered 
transborder area (figure 1). The implementation of such indices into a Geographical Information System (GIS) give 
maps of vulnerability and resilience that can be used by decision-makers in order to support theirs activities on 
territorial management, risk prevention and crisis management. 
 Figure 1: Transborder area of the SECTRAM project (map obtained with Google Maps support) with the main cities 
and the tunnels 
2. Vulnerability and Resilience of a territory: proposal of two indices 
2.1 Definitions 
The term “vulnerability” comes from the Late Latin word “vulnerabilis” meaning “capacity to be injured” or 
“wounding”. This term is mainly used in medical science and nature, and it has been gradually introduced into the 
field of natural and technological risk (Garbolino, 2010).  
D'Ercole and Metzger explain that "territorial vulnerability refers to the idea that there is, within any area, 
identifiable elements likely to generate and disseminate their vulnerability to the entire territory, causing effects that 
can disrupt, compromise or discontinue its operation and development. In this sense, the analysis of territorial 
vulnerability aims primarily to identify, characterize and prioritize the areas from which territorial vulnerability is 
created and diffused. It can therefore enable the definition of areas for which risk prevention measures are highly 
efficient, thereby taking an approach opposite to that of routine interventions aimed at reducing risk, which are often 
just ad-hoc contingency measures.” These authors thus propose to focus on the identification and localization of the 
major vulnerable entities, regardless of the type of hazard, as they are the elements essential to the functioning of the 
territory. 
At the opposite, we can introduce the concept of resilience. According to Rebotier (2007), the territorial resilience is 
considered as “the ability of a social space to recover from disturbance and reduce impacts expected during a future 
disturbance, thanks to learning and the integration of feedback experience in system characteristics". In this case, the 
territorial resilience can be defined by the elements that support the organizations to face hazardous events and crisis 
situations. 
2.2 Proposal of a methodology to assess the territorial vulnerability and resilience 
Starting from these two main definitions of territorial vulnerability and resilience, the authors propose two spatial 
indices:  
- A territorial vulnerability index: the aim of this index is to assess the exposure of people, goods and infrastructures 
to a specific scenario of DGT accident on the transportation network in order to support the decision-makers in their 
activities of risk prevention; 
- A territorial resilience index: the goal of this index is to assess the number of structures and organizations that can 
contribute to manage a crisis situation, like fire departments, police, etc.  
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The authors propose a methodology (figure 2) to implement and apply these two indices on the whole territory and to 
generate maps. This methodology is based on the definition of a territorial model (Garbolino et al., 2012) where the 
territory is described by different elements such as population centers, private properties, buildings open to the public, 
waterways, transport infrastructures, conservation areas, etc. Territorial modeling uses software to manipulate the 
geographic information. It integrates spatial data derived from national bodies, government ministries, local 
authorities or private companies into a GIS. To implement this data, a GIS must provide several modules for the 
display and manipulation of geographic information; a geo-database module, a geo-visualization module and a geo-
manipulation module.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Methodology of implementation and application of territorial vulnerability and resilience indices. 
In this methodology, it is important to do the distinction between vulnerable and resilient factors: we consider as 
vulnerable factors all elements of the territory that can be affected by a hazardous event. These vulnerable factors are 
represented by: 
- Exposed people: Population density, Establishments Receiving Public ERP - (hospitals, schools, stadiums, 
churches, etc.), daily average road traffic for each road section... 
- Exposed goods: Elements of roads (roads, bridges, tunnels), service stations, administrations centres, industries, 
train stations... 
The spatial data come from the National Institute of Statistics and Economy (INSEE) for the description of the 
population, the National Institute of Geography (IGN) for the administrative information, the ERP, service stations 
etc., the Regional Direction of Environment and Planning (DREAL) for the localisation of SEVESO industries, and 
the Regional Observatory of Transports (ORT) for the estimation of the daily average road traffic. 
2.3 Definition of vulnerability levels 
The definition of the vulnerability levels is based on the decree of September 2005 the 29th, supervised by the 
Directive n ° 96/82 of 09 of December 1996 on the control of major accidents involving dangerous substances, that 
defines classes of our vulnerability index. This decree establishes the severity of an accident involving a dangerous 
substance according to its human consequences. Table 1 presents the characterization of a disaster in terms of 
casualties. According to this scale of severity, we propose five levels of vulnerability in order to characterize the 
vulnerability of a territory. 
1- Identification and selection of 
territorial elements (people, goods, 
infrastructures, natural resources, etc.) 
2- Definition of vulnerable elements 2- Definition of resilient elements 
3- Identification of the exposed 
elements according to their level of 
vulnerability 
3- Identification of the non-exposed 
elements that contribute to the 
resilience of the territory 
4- Calculation of the vulnerability and 
resilience indices according to a 
hazardous scenario 
5- Maps of territorial vulnerability and 
territorial resilience 
Table 1: Severity scales of accidents involving hazardous substances according to the decree of September 2005 
Severity level of 
consequences 
Amount of exposed people in the lethal area 
disastrous More than 100 people exposed 
catastrophic Between 10 to 100 people exposed  
important Between 1 to 10 people exposed 
serious More than 1 person exposed 
moderate No people exposed in the lethal area 
 
The levels of territorial vulnerability have the following values: disastrous =4, catastrophic =3, important =2, serious 
=1 and moderate =0. 
For the variable named “population”, the level of vulnerability is directly calculated with the amount of exposed 
people in the lethal area and taking into account the percentage of killed people. The percentage of killed people is 
estimated according to the recommendations provided by the French government and it depends on the vulnerability 
thresholds taking into account the different kind of hazardous phenomena like overpressures, thermal flux and 
atmospheric concentration of toxic substances. The French regulation usually defines three main levels of effects on 
people:  
 The level of irreversible effects: it corresponds to the level below which there are no deaths, only injured people.  
 The level of the first lethal effects: in this zone, 1 % of the exposed people can die; 
 The level of the significant lethal effects: in this zone, there are at least 5 % of the exposed people who can die. 
The definition of the vulnerability levels of the other territorial elements such as the ERP - Establishments Receiving 
Public (hospitals, schools, stadiums, churches, etc.), the Seveso sites, the service stations and the average traffic on 
road was validated with the partners and beneficiaries of the SECTRAM project. Table 2 gathers the different levels 
of vulnerability according each considered territorial elements. 
Table 2: Definition of the vulnerability levels for the considered territorial elements. 
Territorial 
elements 
Moderate 
(0) 
Serious (1) 
Important 
(2) 
Catastrophic 
(3) 
Disastrous (4) 
Population POP=0 0≤POP<1 1≤POP<10 10≤POP<100 POP≥100 
ERP ERP=0 ERP=1 ERP=2 3≤ERP≤4 ERP≥4 
SEVESO 
sites 
SEVESO=0 
SEVESO 
=1 
SEVESO =2 SEVESO=3 SEVESO≥4 
Service 
Stations 
SS=0 SS=1 SS=2 SS=3 SS≥4 
Daily 
Average 
Road 
Traffic  
DART=0 0≤DART<1 1≤DART<10 10≤DART<20 DART≥20 
 
The calculation of the Territorial Vulnerability Index (TVI) according to a specific accident scenario is based on the 
sum of the whole scores for each element and for a specific hazardous area.  
 
Territorial Vulnerability Index (TVI) = Vpop+VERP+VSEVESO+VSS+VDART                                                   (1) 
 
With : 
VPOP = Vulnerability level of Population  
VERP = Vulnerability level of ERP  
VSEVESO = Vulnerability level of SEVESO sites  
VSS = Vulnerability level of Service Stations  
VDART = Vulnerability level of Daily Average Road Traffic 
 
For example, if in the studied territory 25 people are affected by an explosion, the value of the variable POP is equal 
to 3 (catastrophic). If there are two exposed ERP, the vulnerability level of this territorial element is 2 (important). If 
there is 1 service station, its level of vulnerability is 1 (serious) and if the DART is 15, its vulnerability level is equal 
to 3 (catastrophic). In this simple case, where there are no SEVESO sites exposed, the TVI is equal to 10, which is 
disastrous. This denomination derives from the levels of the TVI defined as follow: disastrous ≥ 9, 7 ≤ catastrophic ≤ 
8, 5 ≤important ≤ 6, 3 ≤serious ≤ 4 and 0 ≤ moderate ≤.2. 
2.4 Definition of resilience levels 
The resilient factors are represented by the following elements: fire stations, hospitals, police stations and military 
headquarters. To be considered as resilient factors, theses elements must be localized at less than 4 km from the 
hazardous event and they must be not exposed to this event. This distance was chosen taking into account that the 
emergency means intervene in a very short time, less than 15 min.  
It is important to understand that as long as these elements are not exposed to the consequences of a hazardous event, 
they contribute to the resilience of the territory. However, if these elements are exposed to the consequences of a 
hazard, they increase the vulnerability of the territory. 
Table 3 indicates the levels of resilience of each resilient element according to its distance to an exposed area of a 
DGT accident. 
Table 3: Resilience levels of each resilient element according to their distance to an accidental area. 
Territorial 
elements 
Very 
Important 
(5) 
Important (4) Average (3) Low (2) Very Low (1) 
Firemen 
Stations 
500m>FS 500m≤FS<1000m 1000m≤FS<2000m 2000m≤FS<3000m 3000m≤FS<4000m 
Hospitals 500m>H 500m≤H<1000m 1000m≤H<2000m 2000m≤H<3000m 3000m≤H<4000m 
Police and 
Military 
500m>PM 500m≤PM<1000m 1000m≤PM<2000m 2000m≤PM<3000m 3000m≤PM<4000m 
 
The calculation of the Territorial Resilience Index (TRI) according to a specific accident scenario is based on the sum 
of the whole scores for each element at a certain distance to a specific hazardous area.  
 
 
Territorial Resilience Index (TRI) = RFS+RH+RPM                                                                                     (2) 
 
With :  
RFS = Resilience level of Firemen Stations  
RH = Resilience level of Hospitals 
RPM = Resilience level of Police and Military 
 
For example, if in the studied territory there is a firemen station located at 1km from a DGT accident and this firemen 
station is not exposed to this hazardous event, the resilience level is equal to 3 (average). If there a hospital located at 
700m, the level of resilience is 4 (important), and if there is a Police headquarter at 3 km, the resilience level is 1 
(very low). In this case, the TRI is equal to 8, which is average. The classes of the TRI are the followings: very 
important ≥ 12, 9 ≤ important ≤ 12, 7 ≤average ≤ 9, 4 ≤low ≤ 6 and 0 ≤ very low ≤.3. 
The mapped results for the TVI and the TRI allow a quick identification of the most vulnerable and resilient areas 
through a colour scale of 5 levels. In the following paragraph, the authors discuss the interest of this application. 
3. Application on a transborder territory and assessment for two transportation modes  
The reference scenario is an accident of LPG (Liquid Petroleum Gas) transported by road (with a truck having an 
amount of 19 tons of LPG) and by rail (with an amount of 50 tons of LPG). This accident provokes a BLEVE 
(Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) with distances of lethal effects superior to 200 m. In this example, the 
two transportation modes (road and rail) for LPG are taken into account in order to assess the territorial vulnerability 
and the territorial resilience of this area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Scoring of TVI and TRI from the whole territory to the municipality level. 
Territorial 
levels 
Average 
TVI 
With 
rail 
DGT 
Average 
TVI 
With 
road 
DGT 
Average 
TRI 
With 
rail 
DGT 
Average 
TRI 
With road 
DGT 
Exposed 
population 
by rail 
DGT 
Exposed 
population 
by road 
DGT 
Difference 
of exposed 
population 
(rail – 
road) 
Whole 
territory 
3.73 4.39 4.38 4.36 887.913 758.398 + 129.515 
Alpes-
Maritimes 
(Department) 
5.44 5.79 6.92 6.85 134.176 106.879 + 27.297 
Nice 
(Municipality) 
6.6 6.33 9.68 7.04 63.728 45.060 + 18.668 
The results for the TRI show that they don’t vary a lot at regional and departmental level, but they vary a lot at 
municipally level, due to the same reasons evoked before.  
The calculations of the TVI and the TRI are applied on the whole territory and a zoom was performed in order to 
underlines specificities of urbanized territories. The results are presented in table 4. They show that at the scale of the 
whole territory, the rail DGT seems to be safer because its TVI (3.73) is lower than the road DGT TVI (4.39). But, if 
we compare the amount of potential exposed population of each transportation means, we can identify that rail DGT 
exposes more people to hazardous events than road DGT (+ 129.515). This result seems related to two main reasons: 
rail DGT carries a bigger amount of DG than road DGT, two to three times more. In this case, the hazardous 
distances in case of accident are bigger for the rail DGT and more people may be exposed. The second reason is 
related to the spatial property of railways that cross the urbanized areas, and especially the city center. At the opposite 
the roads used by DGT trucks are highways and/or specific roads to deliver their DG, where there are less people 
when it is possible. By changing the geographical level, the results show a higher TVI for rail DGT than road DGT, 
especially for the reasons evoked before. 
4. Conclusion and perspectives 
The definition of TVI and TRI is a first tool that contributes to identify, with maps and statistics, the level of 
vulnerability and the level of resilience of a territory. These indices are a continuation of the researches developed by 
Garbolino et al. (2007) and Tomasoni et al. (2010). It is important to underline that these indices need to be 
considered with other variables like the amount of exposed population, in order to bring a better accuracy for 
decision-makers. This study also focuses on the differences between the risks generated with two different DGT: the 
road and the rail ones. It is well known that rail DGT is safer than road DGT because of the less probability of 
occurrence of accident with rail (Nicolet-Monnier and Gheorghe, 1996). But trains carry a larger amount of 
hazardous materials than trucks and they cross cities centres. So, they expose more people to a probable hazardous 
event than truck transportation systems. The goal of this paper is not to decide and generalize a solution for urban and 
infrastructures planning, but it aims to highlight that the choice of a transportation system for dangerous goods should 
be evaluated at different geographical levels and should take into account to the spatial properties of the territory. 
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